We show that the expansion of financial sector may hurt innovative activities and hence the innovation-led growth, using data on 50 countries over the 1990-2016 period. Countries with higher level of financial development are found to have a smaller positive or insignificant effect on innovation. The marginal effect of innovation on growth is a decreasing function of financial development. Using a dynamic panel threshold method we re-examine the possible non-linearity between finance, innovation, and growth. We find that innovation exhibits an insignificant effect on output growth when credit to the private sector exceeds the level of 60% as a share of GDP. These results are not driven by banking crises, the long run effect of 2007-2008 financial crisis, or the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis.
Introduction
The basic Schumpeterian model of economic growth considers technological progress as an important factor for long-run growth (Schumpeter (1934) ). The positive role of innovation on growth has been discussed and tested by a number of subsequent works (Scherer et al. (1986) , Freeman et al. (1994) ). Among determinants of innovation, R&D expenditure, talents, technology transfer and networking have been identified as important factors that shape and promote innovation, and hence the innovation-led growth (Love and Roper (1999) , Acemoglu et al. (2016) ). Recent years have seen an expansion in financial sector around the world with several implications on innovation and growth. First, financial development may facilitate innovation activities by alleviating credit constraints on the flow of capital to its most productive projects and hence promote R&D financing and growth (e.g. King and Levine (1993a,b) , Benfratello et al. (2008) , Brown et al. (2009) , Aghion et al. (2012) , Amore et al. (2013) , Hsu et al. (2014) and Levine et al. (2017) ). Second, the expansion of financial sector has raised the concern of "brain drain" between industries (Boustanifar et al. (2017) ). Third, credit expansion shows its dark side on resource allocation, both physical and human capital (Tobin (1984) , Cecchetti et al. (2015) and Borio et al. (2016) ). Collectively, these competing theories and evidences lead to the questions of what is the overall effect of financial development on innovation? Will the monotonic relationship between finance and innovation hold as financial sector continues to expand? How does financial development affect innovation-led growth?
This paper attempts to answer these questions empirically. Previous studies on the financeinnovation-growth nexus support the existence of a positively monotonic relationship. However, we explore whether there exists a non-monotonic relationship with a possible threshold effect. Specifically, our study is conducted in two parts. First, we examine the nonlinear relationship between financial development and innovation. Second, we study the role of financial development on the innovation-growth relationship. To this end, we use two different methods to explore the possible nonlinearities. Initially we qualitatively split the sample into different subgroups by the level of financial development and income, and apply a system-GMM to estimate the effect of financial development on innovation for each group. The system-GMM methodology allows us to use the lagged value of dependent and independent variables to account for potential endogeneity issues. However, this method may not give precise estimation on the threshold value at which the effect changes, if any. For this reason, we also employ a novel GMM model developed by Seo and Shin (2016) . This model extends the Hansen (1999) and Caner and Hansen (2004) static panel threshold model and the Kremer et al. (2013) dynamic panel threshold model by allowing for the transitional variable and other covariates to be endogenous. The Seo and Shin (2016) 's method requires the use of balanced panel with large n and small T . We curtail the data to fit the model using five years non-overlapping average data, which is also consistent with the related growth literature (see for example Asimakopoulos and Karavias (2016) and references therein). To guarantee that our data contains roughly equal proportion of developing and developed countries, we consider only the financial development in credit market. Thus, we end up with a balanced panel of 50 countries from 1990 to 2016, including 22 developing and 28 developed countries.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that the overall effect of financial development on innovation is positive, however, this effect is lower when financial development exceeds a certain level. Second, the overall effect of innovation on growth is positive and heterogeneous across the various levels of financial development. Third, the dynamic panel threshold method shows the existence of non-linear relationship between innovation and growth with a threshold value around 60% of GDP.
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Credit expansion may lead to banking crisis or economic crisis and the innovation activities may be dampened during the crisis (Döner (2017) , OECD (2012) , Comin and Gertler (2006) and Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2008) ). Therefore, the observed vanishing effect may be caused by banking crisis. To check whether the threshold effects are affected by crisis, we interact the crisis dummy with the variable of interest and estimate the difference in the effect between crisis and tranquil period. We find no significant negative effect on the interaction term.
The 2007-2008 financial crisis may have a long run negative effect on innovation. In our sample, 39.2% of the high income countries' innovation never recover to their pre-crisis level and 22.7% of middle income countries' innovation sink after the financial crisis. The subsequent European sovereign debt crisis continually depresses the innovative activities for many countries in Euro Zone (EZ), and probably countries outside the EZ, since 2010. We find that 67.86% of high income countries experienced a reduction in innovation after 2010 and 50% of middle income countries have seen a sluggish recovery in innovation. The situation does not get ameliorated even for countries with high quality of governance. During the same period, however, we find that the level of credit is higher in high income countries and in countries with high governance quality. The documented non-linearity using full sample may be contaminated by the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis and the long run negative effect of the recent financial crisis. Using a sub-sample from 1990 to 2009, we find a robust non-linearity between finance, innovation, and growth.
Our paper relates and contributes to several strands of theory relating growth, innovation, and financial-market development. Our findings provide consistent results with several theoretical predictions and recent empirical studies. Regarding the finance-innovation nexus, Tobin (1984) raised the concerns that too many financial activities may misallocate resources, both physical and human capital, from production sector to less productive financial sector. Cecchetti et al. (2015) and Borio et al. (2016) elaborate this idea by showing that less productive but more pledgeable projects are easily financed during financial sector expansions. When credit inflates, workers, especially the talented STEM workers, are lured into low productivity gains sectors due to high finance compensation (Axelson and Bond (2015) , Boustanifar et al. (2017) and Célérier and Vallée (2018) ). Both channels hurt real sector by reducing the innovation capacity. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) , using firm level data, show that close firm-bank ties may facilitate firms to access credit, but it may also prevent firms from involving risky and high return projects such as R&D activities. Morales (2003) introduces financial sector in an endogenous growth model and shows that financial activity may have two opposite external effects on research productivity. On one hand, the positive effect of financial activity will spill over to other sectors of the economy and promote productivity. On the other hand, however, this positive externality would induce creative destruction process and discourage the incentives to invest in R&D. Inspired by the work of Klette and Kortum (2004) and Akcigit and Kerr (2018) , where different types of innovations are introduced in a growth model, Philippe et al. (2018) argue that the introduction of financial development into these models may result in two competing effects. First, potentially good innovators may face less financing constraints to enter the market due to the development of financial market, which in turn is beneficial to aggregate innovation and growth. Second, less credit constraints may make it easier for less efficient firms to remain in the market and prevent more efficient innovators from entering the market. This in turn may be harmful to aggregate innovation and growth. As financial sector continues to expand in modern economy and credit constraints are alleviated for many firms, it is uncertain whether the overall effect of financial development on innovation is monotonic or not.
In terms of the finance-growth relationship, our results are consistent with several recent empirical papers showing that "too much finance" may hurt economic growth. Using country-and industry-level panel data, Arcand et al. (2015) test the nonlinearity between private credit and growth by including both the private credit and its square term into the growth equation and derives a threshold point of around 100% of GDP. Private credit tends to promote growth in the lower regime, while the effect turns negative in the upper regime. In a similar fashion, Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) estimate the threshold to be nearly 100% of GDP.
2 The baseline models used in these two studies, however, may suffer from endogeneity and multicollinearity issues (see Law and Singh (2014) for discussions). In an attempt to control for these issues, Law and Singh (2014) uses a dynamic panel threshold model proposed by Kremer et al. (2013) to re-estimate the possible threshold effect of private credit on growth and they obtain a threshold of around 88%. Using both dynamic panel threshold method and autoregressive distributed lag ARDL(p,q) techniques, Samargandi et al. (2015) establish the non-monotonic effect of financial development and growth among middle income countries, suggesting a turning point around 91% of GDP. However, most of these studies do not explicitly or directly explore the sources of non-linearity between financial development and growth. Most related to our work is a recent paper by Law et al. (2018) . This paper documents an inverted U-shaped relationship between financial development and innovation using a panel of 75 countries over 1996-2010. The approach used to test possible non-linearities was the inclusion of the squared term of financial development indicators and testing the non-linearity using Lind and Mehlum U-test. Their analysis is embodied in the context of institution quality, where the effect of finance on innovation depends upon the quality of institutions. Our study does not consider the context of institution quality, because there is high overlapping between countries with high quality of governance, high income countries and countries with high level of financial development. Therefore, their study can be considered complementary to ours.
Our study contributes to the related literature in two ways. First, we provide direct evidences that finance-innovation-growth nexus follows a nonlinear relationship as credit expands. The findings show that the threshold effect between finance and innovation serves as a possible channel through which too much finance may hurt growth. Second, this empirical work is conducted using a novel GMM method developed by Seo and Shin (2016) . This model extends the Hansen (1999) and Caner and Hansen (2004) static panel threshold model and the Kremer et al. (2013) dynamic panel threshold model by allowing for the transitional variable and other covariates to be endogenous. Therefore, this new dynamic panel threshold model accounts for the endogeneity issue that is ignored by previous studies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies the empirical models and describes the data. Section 3 presents and discuss the results. Section 4 concludes.
Empirical Specifications and Data

Empirical strategies
The empirical analysis consists of two parts. First, we examine the non-linear relationship between financial development and innovation. Second, we estimate how financial development affect the innovation-growth relationship. To this end, we employ two different methods: linear system GMM and a dynamic panel threshold.
Linear system-GMM
In the linear system-GMM method, we qualitatively split the sample into two groups by the level of financial development. We initially sort the countries by their level of financial development. Then we define the top 25 countries as high financial development countries and the bottom 25 countries as the low financial development countries. This strategy may not give a precise estimation of the threshold level of financial development, but it enables us to build an intuition about the possible nonlinearity between finance, innovation and growth. In our sample, high income countries are typically associated with high level of financial development. As a robustness check, we also split the sample into two groups by their level of GDP per capita: high income countries and middle incomes 3 . For each of the five groups, we consider the following specification for the innovation equation:
where innovation it and innovation it−1 are the current and lagged indicator of innovation. X it denotes the control set including FDI, schooling, population, GDP per capita, and the protection for intellectual property right. F D it is the financial development indicators. u i is the country fixed effect that absorbs the effect of country level variation, v t captures the time fixed effect, which controls for possible cross-sectional dependences. v it captures the stochastic error term. j is an indicator of high and low level of financial development or high and middle income countries. System-GMM use the lagged dependent variable and regressors to instrument for possible endogeneity issues. In our setting, there are two possible causes of endogeneity: the omitted variable issue and reversal causality between financial development and innovation. First, if innovation it−1 is correlated with v it , then in the first-difference transformed equation, ∆innovation it−1 would correlate with ∆v it . Second, technology change relating to communication and data processing have greatly promoted the development of financial services (Frame et al. (2014) ). As instruments we lag our variables twice for the difference equation and once for the level equation. All the variables used are five years non-overlapping average data. Next, we consider how financial development affect the innovation-led growth. In a similar spirit, we split the sample by the level of financial development and GDP per capita. Specifically, we consider the effect of innovation on growth for the high level financial development countries, low level financial development countries, high income countries and middle income countries. For each group we consider the following growth regression:
where y it and y it−1 represent current and lagged growth rate of GDP per capita, respectively. innovation it is the same as in the innovation regression. Z it is the control set including government expenditure (%GDP), trade (%GDP), investment (%GDP), inflation rate (%), Schooling, and initial GDP per capita. u i , τ t and v it refer to country fixed effect, time fixed effect, and stochastic error term, respectively. Notice that our specification is different from conventional regression specified in growth literatures, where y it usually refers to GDP per capita. In our sample, GDP per capita is quite persistent and the Harris-Tzavalis test shows that GDP per capita is not stationary 4 .
Using growth rate of per capita GDP instead of the level does not change our interpretation of the coefficient on variables of interest (see also Asimakopoulos and Karavias (2016) ).
As a robustness check, we also consider the interaction between financial development and innovation. The specification is as follow:
The marginal effect of innovation on growth isα+β * F D it . According to the theoretical prediction, higher level of financial development reduces productivity via brain drain or misallocation in physical capital and the effect of innovation on growth is lower in countries with higher level of financial development. Therefore, if there exists any "diminishing effect" for the innovation-growth nexus due to financial development, α is expected to be greater than zero, while β is expected to be negative.
Dynamic panel threshold model with endogenous threshold variable
Although the linear system-GMM method helps us to build an intuition about the nonlinearity, it gives neither a rigorous test on the linearity nor the estimated threshold value at which the effect begins to change. For this reason, we examine the above two questions using a novel GMM method developed by Seo and Shin (2016) . This model extends the Hansen (1999) and Caner and Hansen (2004) 
Notice that, the financial development is treated as regime dependent variable as well as transitional variable. I(·) is an indicator of the regime. γ is a hypothetical threshold value. The subscripts L and H on α refer to lower and upper regime, respectively. The instrument variables include the exogenous variables, the lagged dependent variable and other covariates. In a similar spirit we estimate our growth equation using a dynamic panel threshold model. In particular, we treat financial development as the threshold variable, while innovation is the regime dependent variable changing according to the estimated threshold of financial development. The notation used here is similar to the innovation equation (4). Therefore, the growth model presented in equation (2) becomes:
For equations (5) and (6), we use the non-linearity test supW = supW n (γ) statistics upon the null of α L − α H = 0 and β L − β H = 0, where W n (γ) is the standard Wald statistic for each fixed γ.
Data and summary statistics
A complete picture of financial development includes the development in both credit and equity markets. Due to the limitation of stock market data in developing countries plus the fact that firms financing in developing countries is mainly through internal retained profits and external credit market, we constraint our study to credit markets. The private credit by banks and other financial institutions as percentage of GDP is preferred in finance-growth literature (Levine et al. (2000) ). As robustness checks, we also consider credit issued to private sector by money deposite banks (%GDP), demostic credit to private sector (%GDP), and liquidity liability (%GDP). All the indicators are obtained from World Bank Financial Structure Database. 5 The banking crisis data is obtained from Laeven and Valencia (2013 ), Systemic Banking Crises Database (1970 . Inspired by Baker et al. (2016) , the data of banking crisis from 2012 to 2016 are extended by searching key words that indicate a banking crisis for each country between 2012 and 2016. The Key words used include bank run, bank crisis and illiquidity.
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The innovation is measured by patent applications per 100 billion USD obtained from World Intellectual Property.
7 This indicator is measured as total equivalent counts by applicant's origin.
We use patent application as an indicator of innovation because there are typically two to three years grant lags between application and grant year, for example, the mean years of grant lags for USPTO fluctuates between 26 months and 32 months, and the distribution of grant lags varies across fields of inventions (Squicciarini et al. (2013) ). Thus, when we consider the effect of innovation on growth, it is not straightforward to determine the proper lag length for a dynamic analysis. Another reason is that the application year better captures the actual effective time of innovation (Griliches et al. (1986) ) and an invention starts to affect the real economy since its inception (Hsu et al. (2014) ). We also use the number of utility models as another measure of innovation 8 . This indicator is obtained from WIPO. The major differences between patents and utility models are as follows. First, the requirements for acquiring a utility model are less stringent than for patents. Second, utility models are cheaper to obtain and to maintain. Third, the term of protection for utility models is shorter than for patents. Therefore, in many countries, utility models are sometimes referred to as "second-class patents". Thus, patents and utility models represent different quality of innovation. 9 Throughout this paper, patents are used as the primary indicator of innovation in the regressions. However, we provide the estimation results for utility models in the dynamic threshold regression as an additional robustness check. For controls in innovation regression, we include net inflow of foreign direct investment (%GDP) measuring the technology diffusion effect; population, which accounts for possible scale effects in the process of innovation; mean years of schooling; GDP per capita; and protection for intellectual property right. Regarding the growth regression, the dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita and the variables of interest are innovation and financial development. We consider innovation as regime dependent variable and take financial development as the threshold variable. The controls include general government final consumption (%GDP), capital formation (%GDP), CPI-based inflation rate (%), trade openness (%GDP), mean years of schooling, and initial GDP per capita. To remove the influence of cyclical components of data, we use five years non-overlapping averages. The final panel consists of 50 countries from 1990 to 2016, among which, 28 are high income countries and the rest are upper and lower middle income countries. Table 1 gives the summary statistics and the sources of data.
[Place Table 1 about here] 3 Results
As a starting point, we build an intuition about the relationship between financial development and innovation by qualitatively splitting the sample into two groups: high financial development countries and low financial development countries. Specifically, the countries are ranked by the level of financial development in an ascending order. Then we define the top half of the sample as countries with high level of financial development, while the other half is defined as countries with low level of financial development. Figure 1 shows that as financial development continues to expand, its effect on innovation tends to decrease. This illustration seems to match the prediction of existing theories, but possibly nonlinearities might exist via other sources. Next, we present the empirical results.
[Place Figure 1 about here] 3.1 Results for linear system-GMM 3.1.1 Financial development and innovation Table 2 reports the basic results for equation (1). In this table, we use private credit as a proxy for financial development and the percentage change in patent application as dependent variable. We implement a two step system-GMM estimation for equation (1). Due to the downward bias in the computed standard errors of two-step estimation, the Windmeijer correction is applied. In each regression, we take population as an exogenous variable, while considering the rest as endogenous variables. The full sample result shows that the overall effect of private credit on innovation is positive and significant. Population, FDI and GDP/capita exhibit a non-negative but insignificant effect on innovation. In addition, schooling and protection for intellectual property right have a negative but insignificant effect. Next, we consider how the effect of private credit change as the level of financial development increases. We find that the effect of private credit on innovation for middle income countries is higher than that of high income countries, and that the overall effect lies between 0.183 and 0.394. Moving to the low and high financial development countries, we find a similar pattern that the effect in low financial development countries is greater than that of high financial development countries. Again, the overall effect lies between the two estimated effects. The p-value of the AR(2) test and Hansen J test are reported at the bottom of Table 2 . The AR(2) tests show no significant correlation between the error term and the lagged dependent variable, which indicates that the use of two lags for the dependent variable serve as valid instruments. The Hansen test shows that the specifications do not suffer from over-identification issue. This exercise is consistent with the intuition in Figure 1 and confirms our hypothesis that "too much finance" would hurt innovative activities. In Table A1 of appendix, we provide robustness checks for regression (1) using other indicators of financial development and we find a similar pattern as in Table 2 .
[Place Table 2 about here]
Financial development, innovation, and growth
This part studies how financial development affects the innovation-growth relationship. Results in Tables 2 and A1 show that innovation may be regime dependent upon the level of financial development, since innovation is a determinant factor for long-run growth, it is possible that the effect of innovation on growth is conditional on the level of financial development. Our hypothesis is that higher level of financial development hurts innovation and thus may reduce its effect on growth. We estimate equation (3) under: i) full sample; ii) middle and high income groups; iii) high and low level of financial development groups. Table 3 provides the results using private credit by banks and other financial institutions (%GDP) as a proxy for financial development (similar to Table 2), and patent per 100 billion USD as an indicator of innovation. Table 3 shows that the overall effect of patent on growth is positive and significant. When split the sample into middle and high income countries, the effect of innovation for middle income countries is larger than that of high income countries. The same pattern appears when we split the sample into low and high level of financial development countries, the effect is positive and significant for low financial development countries, while it is positive and non-significant for high financial develop-ment countries. Also notice that the overall effect lies between the effects of the two subgroups. In terms of the coefficients of other covariates, government consumption affects negatively economic growth, which is consistent with the related literatures. High income and high financial development countries benefit from international trade, while middle income and low financial development countries do not. Developing countries are featured with unsound laws and regulations, less efficient financial market, and low level of human capital. These may impede its capacity to attract foreign investment and to absorb the frontier technologies. Moreover, the negative coefficient of initial GDP per capital captures the convergence effect. Table 3 also reports AR(2) and Hansen J test indicating valid specifications. We further check the robustness of our estimations using alternative indicators of financial development and the results reported in Table 3 remain valid (see Table A2 in the appendix).
[Place Table 3 about here]
Interaction analysis
The results in the previous sub-sections deliver a signal that the effect of innovation on growth may be heterogeneous across countries. Based on this observation, we extend equation (3) to:
where the parameter α i is country specific parameter and depends on financial development
As discussed in introduction, countries with higher level of financial development may suffer from brain drain and misallocation of resources, which may hurt innovation and its effect on growth. We therefore expect a negative sign on β. Combining equations (6) and (7) we can get the form of equation (3). Table 4 reports the results of the interaction analysis. For all the indicators of financial development we find consistent results that the coefficient on interaction term is negative and that the effect of patent is positive and significant. The average marginal effect of patent on growth is α + β * F D it , since α > 0 and β < 0, the overall effect of patent is a decreasing function of financial development. In Figure A2 at the appendix, we simulate the average marginal effect of patent on growth for all the indicators. We find that the marginal effect is a downward trend line and mainly positive. This piece of evidence is consistent with the results reported in Table 3 .
[Place Table 4 about here]
Credit expansion, Banking crisis, Innovation, and Growth
A number of recent empirical studies have documented a "too much finance" pattern using both aggregrate and industrial level data. Major explanations to this evidence include credit expansion induced financial instability and economic volatility (Rajan (2006) , De la Torre et al. (2011)), and misallocation of resources (Tobin (1984) , Cecchetti et al. (2015) ). We find that, in our sample, banking crisis follows closely the credit expansions. Figure A1 in the appendix shows the evolution of private credit for U.S., UK, Japan, Malaysia, and China. For each country, a banking crisis takes place when credits tend to expand. For example, Malaysia experienced a banking crisis between 1997-1998, during which period the private credit level is at the highest level in our sample. Table 5 shows the difference in financial development between crisis and tranquil period. On average, the level of private credit is significantly higher than in tranquil period. Banking crisis may affect innovation performance and investments via several mechanisms (Döner (2017) , OECD (2012)). For example, a crisis causes a reduction in the demand for products dampening the incentives to innovate. In addition, firms may suffer from credit constraints and difficulties in accessing financing during banking crisis causing a reduction in riskier activities such as R&D expenditurers. This pro-cyclical pattern of R&D and innovation has been observed over various business cycles and for a variety of countries (e.g. Comin and Gertler (2006) , Francois and LloydEllis (2008) ). The "vanishing effect" documented in Tables 3 and 4 may be attributable to the potential negative effect of banking crisis on innovation. Therefore, we consider the interaction between innovation and banking crisis in the following equation:
where BC it is the dummy for banking crisis for country i at year t. The value is 1 if there is a banking crisis at year t and 0 for tranquil periods. δ measures the difference effect of finance on innovation between crisis and tranquil period with an expected non-negative. Arcand et al. (2015) show that economic volatility does not play a major role in the vanishing effect of financial development. Thus, we expect that banking crisis does not impose a significant impact on innovation-growth nexus. The results in Table 6 show that banking crisis and patent have the expected signs. Regarding the interaction term, we do not find a significant negative effect, which means that the vanishing effect of innovation on growth is not a result of banking crisis.
[Place Tables 5 and 6 about here] 3.1.5 The European sovereign debt crisis and long run impact of financial crisis since 2009
The 2007-2008 financial crisis may have a long term negative impact on innovative activities and innovation-led growth. The potential long-term negative effects on innovation and growth, if any, can transmit through the negative effects on human capital, future investment on R&D activities, technological leadership, and public support systems for innovation (OECD (2012) ). In order to assess the heterogeneous impact of post financial crisis on innovation for different types of countries, we divide our sample into four groups: high income countries, middle income countries, countries with high quality of governance, and countries with low quality of governance.
We consider the quality of governance because the potential negative effect on innovation may depend on the soundness of the quality of governance.
10 We use the index of quality of governance (QOG), proposed by Teorell et al. (2018) , to measure the quality of government. A country is considered as high QOG if the index is above the 50 percentile of all countries. Panel A of Table 7 provides a brief summary of the innovation resilience after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. To assess how financial crisis affects the innovation in the long run, we construct three indicators to measure the innovation recovery after the financial crisis. The first indicator is called Sinking Ratio, which is defined as the ratio of countries whose innovation level do not recover to its pre-crisis level through the whole post financial crisis period examined in our sample. We use the average level of innovation in year 2005 and 2006 as the pre-crisis level of innovation. Meanwhile, year 2009 is set as the initial year after the financial crisis. The sinking ratio shows that 39.2% of high income countries never recover to its pre-crisis level of innovation between 2009-2016. Similarly, 38.4% high QOG countries do not fully recover to its pre-crisis level of innovation. However, the sinking ratio is lower for middle income and low QOG countries. Next, we consider how long does it take for a country to recover from crisis. The average years of recovery is defined as the average years needed to return to pre-crisis level for those recovered countries. We find that middle income and low QOG countries take longer to recover to pre-crisis level than that of high income and high QOG countries. The average years needed to recover for high income and high QOG countries is between 0.43 and 0.5, however, this time is around 1.4 for middle income and low QOG countries. We also take a look at the years needed for the first positive growth of innovation after crisis, which is defined as average years of first turning point. We find that for each of the four groups, countries tend to recover in a quarter after 2009. Overall, middle income and low QOG countries take longer to recover to pre-crisis innovation level, but the sinking ratio 10 The literature on the effect of Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCP) show that better supervisory governance and supervisory unification were generating a positive impact on financial sector stability and banking soundness pre-2008 financial crisis. However, these conclusions do not hold when the period examined covers the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Quintyn et al. (2011) find a negative relationship between supervisory governance and economic resilience using a panel of 100 countries. Countries with a solid supervisory governance system hurt more during the 2007-2008 crisis. If this evidence is reliable, then one possible explanation is that innovation recovers slowly or is unable to return to pre-crisis level for countries with high quality of governance.
is lower than that of high income and high QOG countries. This indicates that the self-healing ability after crisis in middle income and low QOG countries is stronger. These facts from our sample are consistent with the pattern in Quintyn et al. (2011 Table 7 , is higher for high income and high QOG countries. Table 8 shows a regression test on the impacts of post financial crisis and ongoing European sovereign debt crisis on the innovation. We define the dummy LC = 1 for the years after 2009 and LC = 0 if otherwise. The interaction term between financial development and LC is negative. This indicates that the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis and post financial crisis impose a significant negative effect on innovation.
Combining these facts, it is possible that the diminishing effect of finance on innovation-led growth is caused by the ongoing ESDC and long run negative effect of financial crisis. To check the robustness of our results, we delete the sample after 2010 to rule out the influence of post financial crisis and European Debt Crisis. The results in Table 9 use private credit as indicator of financial development, 13 show that the pattern is quite similar to that of the full sample. In the growth regression, the overall effect of patent is positive and higher for middle income and low level of financial development countries. This shows that the nonlinearity between finance, innovation, and growth is robust and is independent of the financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis.
[Place Tables 7, 8 , and 9 about here]
11 For example, the globalization of finance; easy credit conditions during 2002-2008 period that encouraged highrisk lending and borrowing practices; international trade imbalance; the inaccordance between unified Euro Zone monetary policy and independent fiscal policy of individual sovereign country.
12 Notice that, we cannot attribute a country's declination of innovation after 2010 simply to the impact of ESDC, for example, we find that Argentina and Brazil show a negative trend. This, however, could be a compound effect of both long-run effect of financial crisis and other domestic factors. 13 We also use other indicators of financial development for robustness check, and the results are similar.
Brief summary
The results illustrated in this sub-section reveal the existence of possible nonlinearity between financial development, innovation, and growth. Countries with higher level of financial development tend to have a lower rate of innovation and growth. The results are robust under a series of robustness checks. However, the sample is qualitatively splitted, and the threshold at which the nonlinearity occur is not rigorously estimated. To quantitatively measure whether there is a threshold for the finance-innovation-growth nexus, we employ a dynamic panel threshold method developed by Seo and Shin (2016) .
Dynamic Panel Threshold Result
Seo and Shin (2016)'s model extends Hansen (1999) and Caner and Hansen (2004) 
Innovation regression
In innovation regression, equation (4), we consider financial development as a threshold variable as well as a regime dependent variable. Financial development could be endogenous due to omitted variables and the reversal causality between technology progress and financial service. Technology changes relating to telecommunications and data processing have greatly spurred financial innovations and services in commercial banking that have facilitated secondary markets for retail loans, such as credit card debt and mortgages. For example, the introduction of Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), Debit Cards, Online Banking and Prepaid Cards have significantly enhanced the banking account access and amount of credits (Frame et al. (2014) ). It is hence necessary to take the endogeneity issue of financial development into account. Previous panel threshold methods cannot handle the endogeneity issue of the threshold variable and other covariates. Seo and Shin (2016)'s model construct the set of instrumental variables using the lagged dependent variable, the threshold variable and other covariates. Table 10 shows the results for every indicator of financial development using dynamic panel threshold method. For private credit in column (1), the effect of FD is positive and significant in the lower regime, while it becomes insignificant in the upper regime. The estimated threshold value of banking credit is 48% and the linearity test indicates an overall significant non-linear relationship. In addition, the over-identification test(Jtest) indicates no over-identification issues. Moving from column (2) to (4), we find consistent results with that of private credit and with estimated threshold values at around 50%.
[Place Table 10 about here]
Growth regression
In growth regression, equation (5), we consider the financial development as the threshold variable and innovation as the regime dependent variable. The endogeneity role of financial development in the finance-growth relationship is undetermined. Evidences from country cross-section, time series, and panel data studies provide mixed pictures on the causality between financial development and growth. Using cross sectional data, King and Levine (1993a) , Levine et al. (2000) and Levine et al. (2003) show evidence of one-way causation, that financial development leads to growth. Subsequent studies cast doubts on the cross-section country evidences. Cross-sectional data may cause spurious correlation arising from nonstationarity. To overcome this potential issue, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) use time series data for 16 countries and conduct cointegration test, they find evidence of bi-directionality and even evidence of reverse causality. Also, they find that the causal relationship between financial development and growth is country-specific. However, time series evidence may also be unreliable due to the short time span of data. A good option may be the use of panel data. Using panel data of ten developing countries Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004) apply a panel cointegration analysis and find evidence in support of the cross-section country studies. Calderón and Liu (2003) use a panel of 105 countries from 1960 to 1994 and find that, in general, financial development leads to growth. However, the effect is heterogeneous across countries and larger in developing countries. Moreover, they find that Granger causality test shows a bi-directional causality between financial development and growth. In sum, the above evidences reveal the possibility of reversal causality between financial development and growth. This leads us to consider the threshold variable (the indicator of financial development) as endogenous. Regarding the endogeneity issue of other covariates, innovation may also be endogenously determined by economic development. High income countries typically invest more in R&D activities and hence promote innovation. Government spending, trade, inflation, schooling, and investment may also be endogenous due to reverse causality and omitted variable issues. To account for the endogeneity issues, we use the lagged threshold variable, regime dependent variable, dependent variable and other covariates as instruments. Table 11 summarizes the basic results for the dynamic panel threshold regression for every financial development indicators, estimating equation (5). Column 1 shows the results from the use of private credit as financial development indicator. The coefficient of patent is positive and significant for the lower regime, while it is negative at the upper regime. The estimated threshold value is 58.4% of GDP. The p-value of the linearity test shows a significant non-linearity between two regimes. Using alternative indicators of financial development, we obtain similar results, except for liquidity. Specifically, banking credit and domestic credit generate a threshold value of 58.5% and 57.7%, respectively. However, for liquidity liability both lower and upper regime show negative effect, while the estimated threshold is 136.7%. One possible reason for the high estimated threshold value for liquidity liability is that the tail of liquidity density is longer than the others. The Kernel density of the four indicators are plotted in Figure A3 in the appendix. Obviously, the density of liquidity liability is significantly right-skewed, which may explain the relatively larger threshold value.
As a robustness check, we re-examine our growth estimations taking into account the utility models as alternative indicator of innovation. The results in Table A3 show that the estimated threshold remains around 60%, which is consistent with the results using patents, with the liquidity liability generating again a higher threshold.
[Place Table 11 about here]
Discussion
Most of the estimated threshold values in finance-growth literature are between 53% and 100%. For example Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) and Arcand et al. (2015) estimate a threshold of around 100%, Masten et al. (2008) between 53% and 70%, Law and Singh (2014) at 88%, and Samargandi et al. (2015) at 91%. In our sample, the estimated threshold values are at about 60%. While this value is towards the smaller value of the range reported in the related literature, we argue that this is due to the properties of our sample. Specifically, our threshold values for the financial indicators are very close to their sample medians which is lower than their sample means indicating that the financial development data for the majority of the countries in our sample are around our estimated threshold (see Table 1 for more details). In Table 12 we provide an additional test by re-estimating equation (5) considering the financial development as both the threshold variable and the regime dependent variable. This way we test the threshold effect between finance and growth. Therefore, equation (5) becomes:
The results indicate an estimated threshold value of about 60%, which is very close with the results from the previous sub-section presented in Tables 11 and A3 . This shows that the results we obtained in the previous sub-section, where we allowed for innovation to switch according to the financial indicator, remain valid even if we do not consider innovation as a regime dependent variable. Therefore, innovation does not affect significantly the estimated threshold of financial development, but it seems to be significantly affected by the level of financial development.
Combining the evidences in Tables 10, 11 , and 12, is very clear that the threshold effect of financial development on innovation serves as an important channel through which "too much finance" may hurt growth.
[Place Table 12 about here]
Conclusion
This paper has empirically tested the hypothesis that an expansion in financial sector would hurt innovation and innovation-led growth, using a panel of 50 countries over 1990-2016. The results from a linear system-GMM shows that countries with higher level of financial development are associated with a relatively low rate of innovation. Furthermore, this vanishing effect between finance and innovation would finally transmit to innovation-led growth. We find that the positive effect of innovation on growth is smaller or even insignificant for countries with developed financial sector. These conclusions are robust to the banking crisis, the long run effect of 2007-2008 financial crisis, the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis and alternative indicators of financial development. To precisely estimate the threshold value at which the vanishing effect starts, a dynamic panel threshold model is employed. We find that, for our sample of countries, innovation starts to have an insignificant effect on output growth when private credit reaches the level of around 60% of GDP. We have shown that this smaller threshold value is due to the property of our sample. This study also shows that the expansion of financial sector affects not only the quantity of innovation filed, but also the quality of innovation. We use two different types of inventions to reflect the difference in the quality of innovation and we find that both types of innovation exhibit a threshold effect with the level of financial development. Gordon (2018) documented a counterintuitive fact that the U.S. productivity growth decline after 2006 despite an increase in the rate at which new U.S. patents were issued between 2006 and 2016. The slowdown may be explained by the maturity of IT industry, declined productivity of researchers, diminishing return of innovation and less revolutionary inventions or breakthroughs compared to decades ago. Therefore, despite an increase in the quantity of innovation in U.S., the quality of innovation may have declined. We think that the reduction of quality of innovation may be attributable to the expansion of financial sector. The effect of innovation is assumed to be heterogeneous across countries. The lower and upper limit of interval for each variable is assigned to its min and max value, the step width is set as 0.02. 95% of confidence interval reported Figure A3 : Kernel density of four indicators of financial development Note: Estimated density of indicators of financial development using Epanechnikov kernal density 
